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Relief and Rescue: Suspensions and Elasticity in Financial Regulation, and 
Lessons from the UK’s Management of the Covid-19 Pandemic Crisis 
 
Iris H-Y Chiu*, Andreas Kokkinis** and Andrea Miglionico*** 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic severely impacted economic activity as lockdowns 
were imposed in many countries.1 In the UK, economic impact has been severe as output is 
reduced by at least 20% compared to the same period in the previous year.2  
 
The financial implications of economic lockdown in so many sectors were immediate as the 
corporate sector is heavily financialized.3 The freezing of business activity has implications for 
business’ cash flow, servicing of debt, potential insolvency and their market valuation and 
credit rating assessments. Further, the decline of market appetite triggers investors’ behavioural 
bias towards cash (using Lo’s adaptive capital markets hypothesis),4 and adversely affects 
levels of private investment in the corporate sector.5 The economic woes for businesses and 
corporations are inevitably also financial woes. Besides public finance packages for emergency 
help, such as furloughing,6 policymakers have turned to private sector finance to alleviate the 
financial stresses and hardships caused to households and corporations. Private sector finance 
is being relied on, to a significant extent, but not exclusively, to meet the policy goals of ‘relief’ 
and ‘rescue’ for households and corporations. ‘Relief’ refers to the policy goal of giving 
corporations and households temporary release from the pressures of debt which would be 
exacerbated in the weak economic conditions during the pandemic. ‘Rescue’ refers to 
facilitating the access of corporations to finance to keep them afloat in relation to expenses, 
losses and shoring up for the future.  
 
 
* Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation, University College London, Research Fellow European 
Corporate Governance Institute. 
** Senior Lecturer of Law, University of Birmingham. 
*** Lecturer of Law, University of Reading. 
We are grateful to Pierre Schammo and Luca Enriques for comments on an earlier draft which is now an ECGI 
Working Paper. 
1 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-52103747. 
2 ‘UK GDP falls by record 20.4% in April as lockdown paralyses economy’ (The Guardian, 12 June 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jun/12/britains-gdp-falls-204-in-april-as-economy-is-paralysed-by-
lockdown. 
3 Karen Ho, Corporate Nostalgia? Managerial Capitalism from a Contemporary Perspective, in Greg Urban (ed), 
Corporations and Citizenship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2014). 
4 Andrew W Lo, The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis: Market Efficiency from an Evolutionary Perspective, 30 The 
Journal of Portfolio Management 15 (2014). 
5 ‘Investors pull record €250bn from European funds.’ Financial Times, April 22, 2020. 
https://www.ft.com/content/29d69ff6-749b-45dc-b53e-85a236186983; “UK investors flee equity funds on 
coronavirus fears.” Financial News, February 27, 2020, https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/uk-investors-flee-
equity-funds-on-coronavirus-fears-20200227. 
6 ‘Claim for wages through the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme’, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/claim-for-
wages-through-the-coronavirus-job-retention-scheme. 
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These policies are not dissimilar to those undertaken by many countries.7 In the UK, which is 
the focus of the article, the policy goals of relief and rescue were carried out by the enactment 
of emergency legislation8 as well as by regulatory actions under the leadership of financial 
regulators, i.e. the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)9 and Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA).10 The PRA and FCA suspended the application of certain regulatory laws and private 
contractual laws applicable to their regulated entities. Regulatory suspension can be seen as 
one of the ways the ‘elasticity’ of law is realized in order to cater for wider political, social and 
economic needs.11  
 
Legal elasticity is treated as a policy instrument,  but it has been more fully theorized in Pistor’s 
legal theory of finance.12 In this theorization, law is central for constructing finance, hence, 
legal elasticity is resorted to when existing law is no longer able to meet overarching policy 
goals such as financial stability. This theorization depicts law in an instrumental sense and 
bound up with power structures that influence legal change, but also treats law in a structural 
sense.13 Hence, legal elasticity may not avoid structural effects, such as institutional dissonance 
and change.  
 
We situate the regulatory suspensions introduced by UK financial regulators during the Covid-
19 crisis within the theorization of legal elasticity in Pistor’s legal theory of finance. Further, 
our study, although focused on the UK, offers lessons and insights for developed financial 
jurisdictions that have also embarked financial regulatory suspensions.14 We argue that 
regulatory suspensions should be perceived as going beyond merely being instrumental. It is 
imperative to explore the nature of regulatory suspensions within the framework of legal 
elasticity as a fully theorized account so regulators can perceive more fully the implications of 
their deployment.  
 
Section II explores the concept of legal elasticity as theorized in the wake of the global financial 
crisis of 2007-09. We argue that this concept can be extended to encompass regulatory 
suspensions introduced in the Covid-19 crisis, being equally applicable to regulatory 
suspensions triggered by endogenous financial sector problems or exogenous shocks. Legal 
elasticity has been deployed as the policy agenda of ‘relief and rescue’ which represent 
welfarist and public interest objectives are not easily accommodated in financial regulation, 
due to the efficiency-dominated paradigm of financial regulation.15  
 
However, in its application to credit laws and regulation examined in Section III and capital 
markets regulation explored in Section IV, legal elasticity challenges the institutional 
 
7 IMF, ‘Policy Responses to Covid-19’, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-
COVID-19. 
8 The UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020. 
9 The prudential regulator oversees 2,000+ banks, insurers and systemically important financial institutions. 
10 The conduct regulator oversees all financial institutions, including PRA-authorized institutions in respect of 
business conduct. 
11 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315 (2013). 
12 Pistor (2013), 317. 
13 Section II. 
14 Many jurisdictions in Europe have introduced ‘relief’ measures like debt payment moratoria, supported by 
prudential regulation suspensions, https://eba.europa.eu/coronavirus; forbearance and moratoria. In the US, see 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, (CARES Act), HR 748, March 27, 2020.  
15 FCA, Economics for Effective Regulation (2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/occasional-
papers/occasional-paper-no-13-economics-effective-regulation. 
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coherence of regulatory regimes and this tension has resulted in a number of unanswered 
questions and unintended consequences. Sections III and IV examine the hazards such 
regulatory suspensions could entail to regulators, banks, markets and the intended beneficiaries 
themselves- i.e. households and corporations.  
 
Section V argues that regulators’ deployment of legal elasticity can be better supported by 
decision-making frameworks that are based on a fully theorized understanding of legal 
elasticity. We make three proposals for improving regulators’ decision-making in deploying 
legal elasticity.  This article does not argue that by more optimally deploying legal elasticity, 
substantive policy agendas such as ‘relief and rescue’ would also be optimal. What we argue 
is that whatever the substantive policies in place, where financial regulatory suspensions are 
regarded as part of the policy mosaic, the use of legal elasticity should be a fully apprised one 
and should not add to existing substantive challenges. This is important as for a second time, 
financial regulators in many jurisdictions have looked to legal elasticity at a significant scale 
for crisis management, even if this is not a financial sector originated crisis. However, we 
confine our proposals on the optimal use of legal elasticity in finance, as Section II explains 
how legal elasticity is anchored in the legal theory of finance. Other regulatory areas may not 
be susceptible to as much legal construction as in finance. We do not discount the possibility 
that other regulatory ‘enterprises’16 can benefit from this study but we do not claim direct 
applicability within the confines of this article. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. LEGAL ELASTICITY IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
Legal elasticity is argued to be a function of the legal theory of finance posited by Pistor.17 The 
legal theory of finance frames finance in legal terms, as financial transactions and obligations 
are constructed as legal structures in order to work as intended. In particular, finance is 
underpinned by the crucial qualities of certainty and enforceability that law supplies. However, 
in the global financial crisis, it was observed that the very qualities of certainty and strict 
enforceability of financial obligations and transactions in various markets would collectively 
lead to damaging consequences, a manifestation of systemic risk.18 As such, the solution is also 
found in law, i.e. to resort to legal elasticity in order to suspend and mitigate the adverse 
impacts driven by law, in order to meet the needs of crisis management. 
 
In this theoretical framework, legal elasticity served an unwinding purpose- i.e. to unwind the 
adverse effects caused by its very own legal nature in the first place, when the broader policy 
goals sought to be achieved are shifted. Elasticity also redeems financial law or regulation and 
paves the way for law reform. The post-crisis reforms to the banking and financial sector 
reflected this conceptualization of legal elasticity. For example, where banks had been unable 
to absorb their losses during the global financial crisis, legal elasticity was applied so that 
regulatory discipline was not meted out to them for being inadequately capitalized. Instead, 
 
16 This term refers to different regulatory areas warranting different approaches taken by relevant respective 
regulatory agencies, Tony Prosser, Regulatory Enterprises (Oxford: OUP 2010). 
17 Pistor (2013), 320. 
18 Steven Schwarz, Systemic Risk, 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193 (2008). 
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many jurisdictions bailed out their banks by injecting state capital19 and then proceeded to 
reform capital rules to tie banks to higher and more robust levels of capitalization.20  
The application of legal elasticity by UK policymakers and regulators to credit and capital 
markets during the Covid-19 crisis seemed arguably not in the same vein, as regulatory 
suspensions were articulated to be temporary. This near-term perception of regulatory 
suspensions can be attributed to the sophisticated development of financial regulation after the 
crisis, which includes inherently flexible regulations.21 Regulators constructed an increasingly 
prescriptive regime for prudence22 and conduct23 by banks and financial institutions- and also 
carved out particular measures of inherent flexibility.24 This juristic development suggests that 
legal elasticity in finance may have been theoretically enriched by the provision of ex ante 
discretion and flexibility, and not just ex post discretion argued in Pistor’s legal theory of 
finance. 
 
However, we observe in Sections III and IV that during the Covid-19 crisis, regulators 
exhausted inherently flexible measures and moved to relax unexpected regulatory rules, in 
order to advance the policy demands of relief and rescue. These are framed to be bundled with 
the inherently flexible rules, arguably showing hesitation and ambivalence in deploying legal 
elasticity.25 This ex post exercise of legal elasticity raises a new question: can legal elasticity 
take place within institutional stability? The post-crisis conceptualization of legal elasticity is 
structural in nature, and a pathway to institutional change. Is legal elasticity during the Covid-
19 crisis be temporary?  
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Regulatory Elasticity- A Hypothesis 
 
19‘Rescue packages: what governments have offered’ (20 October 2008), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/3229434/Rescue-packages-what-governments-have-offered-financial-
crisis.html. 
20 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf; Basel Committee, Finalising Post-crisis 
Reforms (2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf. The European Union introduced additional rules in 
Directive 2013/36/EU (Capital Requirements IV Directive 2013); Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital 
Requirements Regulation 2013), amended 2019 by Regulation 2019/876. 
21 ‘Embedded flexibility’ was mentioned by the European Banking Authority, ‘EBA statement on actions to 
mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on the EU banking sector’ (12 March 2020), 
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/General%20Pages/Coronavirus/EBA%20S
tatement%20on%20Coronavirus.pdf.  
22 Iris H-Y Chiu and Joanna Wilson, Banking Law and Regulation (Oxford: OUP 2019), chs.8-13; Iris H-Y Chiu, 
Rethinking the Law and Economics of Post-Crisis Micro-prudential Regulation- The Need to Invert the 
Relationship of Law to Economics?, 38 Review of Banking and Financial Law 639 (2019). 
23 Chiu and Wilson (2019), chs.11-12. 
24 Eg. counter-cyclical buffer in microprudential regulation, Section III. 
25 Sections III and IV. 
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This question is of importance as regulators wish to avoid an application of legal elasticity 
whose effects then take them by surprise. However, our examinations in Sections III and IV 
suggest that signs of unintended structural effects are already occurring. Even if legal elasticity 
encompasses ‘degrees’ of elasticity, regulators should not assume that no institutional 
dissonance would result. In this manner, we may be able to add to the conceptualization of 
legal elasticity in Pistor’s legal theory of finance, in hypothesising the structural nature of legal 
elasticity, beyond merely instrumental. Such a spectrum of structural effects can be dependent 
on legal factors such as how far legal effects are suspended, and for how long, and other factors 
such as the nature of policy rhetoric in which regulatory suspensions are framed. These are 
issues that can be further explored empirically in future work.   
 
It is fully understandable that the financial regulators in the UK wish to secure institutional 
consistency despite the application of legal elasticity. The post-crisis financial regulatory 
reforms have taken more than a decade,26 and regulators have no appetite for major institutional 
changes. Further, the Covid-19 crisis is regarded as a crisis exogenous to the financial sector 
and should not entail existential consequences for the substance of laws/regulations.  
 
Our call to fuller theorization and appraisal of legal elasticity is not intended to ‘create more 
work’ for regulators during this stressful time. This exercise would do much to spare regulators 
from unexpected and longer-term challenges down the road. At a broader level, a fully 
theorized understanding of legal elasticity allows this regulatory tool to be used more optimally 
in crisis management. More general application of legal elasticity as a regulatory tool can also 
be theoretically anchored in responsive regulation.27 Although Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s work 
in ‘responsive regulation’ was most famous for its enforcement pyramid, it more broadly 
redefined the nature and directions for modern regulation.28 It provides a vision of regulatory 
dynamism for substantive purposes29 and purposes relating to regulatory participation,30 
processes31 and implementation.32 Legal elasticity is more richly based if regarded as an 
extension of the responsive regulatory paradigm. We turn to examine the use of regulatory 
suspensions in the credit and capital markets in the UK. 
 
III. REGULATORY SUSPENSIONS IN CREDIT LAWS AND REGULATION: 
ADVANCING ‘RELIEF AND RESCUE’  
 
During the Covid-19 crisis in the UK, a key policy concern is how credit arrangements would 
affect households and corporations that are in debt and/or need additional financing by debt.  
 
26 The Basel Committee’s reforms between 2009-2017, and the EU’s regulatory regime finalised in 2013, 
amended 2019. 
27 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: OUP 
1992). 
28 Christine Parker, Twenty Years of Responsive Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 Regulation and 
Governance 2 (2013). 
29 E.g. Cristie Ford, Innovation and the State: Finance, Regulation and Justice (Cambridge: CUP 2017) on 
regulatory aims to promote innovation. 
30 Eg Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World, 54 Current Legal Problems 103 (2001). 
31 E.g. meta-regulation, Colin Scott, Regulating Everything (2008), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532865. 
32 Eg Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen (eds), Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to 
Regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011). 
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Borrowers, both households and corporations, need temporary relief from the pressures of debt 
while regrouping themselves during the crisis. Second, access to finance and credit to 
businesses should continue in order to avoid key social losses such as protecting jobs and 
business suppliers from knock-on effects.33 In the US, personal finance forbearance is devolved 
to the private sector,34 possibly with state regulatory guidance. As the FCA has a consumer 
protection mandate,35 measures on personal finance were introduced from the early stages of 
the pandemic. Relief for corporate borrowers is explicit in both the US36 and UK.37 
 
A. RELIEF FOR BORROWERS 
 
Explicit loan forbearance is introduced in the UK, suspending the operation of contractual 
obligations for FCA-regulated lenders in consumer credit and household mortgages. As the 
FCA does not have regulatory perimeter over business lending, an Act of Parliament was 
passed to give temporary relief for business borrowers.38  
 
Regulators require mortgage lenders to grant a payment holiday, originally for three months 
from March 2020, subsequently extended until end October, to any customer who indicates 
they potentially experience difficulties.39 This measure does not affect the accrual of interest 
on the loan and lenders need not investigate the individual circumstances of each customer who 
requests for the payment holiday. The balance achieved is that customers are not imposed with 
burdens to prove that they can afford a payment holiday, but lenders are not asked to forego 
their expected earnings. Defaulting customers at the commencement of the guidance would 
enjoy temporary relief from enforcement.  
 
Other consumer credit customers enjoy similar relief in payment holidays, including personal 
loans and credit cards. Consumers with an arranged overdraft can request an additional interest-
free overdraft facility of £500 for a three-month period.40 High-cost short-term credit 
 
33 Thomas Huertas, “Here is How Banks Can Help Save the Economy”. Financial Times, May 11, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/f02df444-8f78-11ea-bc44-dbf6756c871a. 
34 McKinsey, ‘What next for US credit card debt’ (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/what-next-for-us-credit-card-debt#. There 
seems some forbearance for student debt and mortgage debt underwritten by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
‘Personal finance tips: How to pay the bills during the coronavirus pandemic’ (March 23, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/03/23/mortgage-bills-student-loan-moratorium-covid-19-
coronavirus-personal-finance/2894392001/.  
35 Section 1C, UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (amended 2012). 
36 Sections 1102, 1105, CARES Act 2020. 
37 n8. 
38 n8. 
39 FCA, Mortgages and coronavirus: information for consumers (20 March 2020), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/mortgages-coronavirus-consumers (updated on 19 June 2020). 
40 FCA, FCA confirms further support for consumer credit customers (1 July 2020), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-confirms-further-support-consumer-credit-customers. 
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customers,41 motor finance and ‘buy-now-pay-later’ or ‘rent-to-own’ borrowers also benefit 
from deferred payment requests up to 31 October 2020.42  
 
As business lending is not regulated by the FCA, fast-tracked legislation was passed to allow 
indebted companies to apply for a moratorium. Directors can make such an application if they 
are of the view that the company is unable to pay its debts. They need to appoint an insolvency 
practitioner as ‘monitor’ to verify that rescue for the company is possible.43 A successful 
application for moratorium allows the company to enjoy relief, except specified obligations 
such as rent and employees’ wages, for an initial 20 days with a possible  extension.44 During 
the period of the moratorium, no insolvency proceedings can commence against the company. 
The company should seek arrangements with its creditors or explore avenues of raising finance 
during this period. 
 
In order to support loan forbearance, the inherently flexible measures in micro-prudential 
regulation were deployed. The macro-prudential regulator in the UK, the Bank of England’s 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), has oversight of the systemic health of the financial 
system,45  and is able to exercise an inherently flexible power to adjust a prudential regulatory 
measure known as the countercyclical buffer (CCyb). The CCyb was introduced in the wake 
of the global financial crisis to allow the macroprudential regulator to impose capital cost on 
banks to dampen pro-cyclical creation of debt.46 Imposing the CCyb moderates financial 
institutions’ behaviour and markets’ tendencies towards a cycle of Minskian instability.47 Prior 
to the onset of the Covid-19 crisis, the CCyb was set at 1% for UK banks to be elevated to 2% 
by December 2020 as economic activity looked strong and banks should be prevented from 
excessive risk-taking. This was abruptly adjusted to 0% during the Covid-19 crisis,8 freeing up 
for banks an estimated capital cost of £190bn.48 As Masur and Posner49 argue, the CCyb is 
designed to shape the incentives of financial actors inherently biased towards procyclicality. In 
downturns, as has been caused by the onset of the Covid-19 crisis, the relaxation of prudential 
regulation that is inherently adjustable is merely counter-cyclical regulation that counteracts 
excessively risk-averse behaviour.  
 
41 FCA, Coronavirus: information for consumers on personal loans, credit cards, overdrafts, motor finance and 
other forms of credit (3 April 2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/coronavirus-information-personal-loans-
credit-cards-overdrafts; High-cost short-term credit and coronavirus: temporary guidance for firms (24 April 
2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/finalised-guidance/high-cost-short-term-credit-and-coronavirus-
temporary-guidance-firms. This is updated in High-cost short-term credit and coronavirus: updated temporary 
guidance for firms (3 July 2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/guidance-consultations/high-cost-short-
term-credit-coronavirus-updated-temporary-guidance-firms. 
42 FCA, FCA announces proposals to further support motor finance and high cost credit customers (3 July 2020), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-announces-proposals-further-support-motor-finance-high-cost-
credit-customers. 
43 S3, 6, 7, Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020. 
44 S9-10, 18, 20, 21, id. 
45 S9Aff, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  
46 Art 128(7), Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU. 
47 Hyman P Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis. Levy Economics Institute Working Paper, 1992, 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf. 
48 Bank of England, Bank of England measures to respond to the economic shock from Covid-19 (11 March 2020), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/boe-measures-to-respond-to-the-economic-shock-from-
covid-19; PRA, Statement by the PRA accompanying measures announced by the Financial Policy Committee. 
(11 March 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2020/statement-by-the-
pra-accompanying-measures-announced-by-the-fpc. 
49 Jonathan S Masur and Eric A Posner, Should Regulation be Counter-cyclical?, 34 Yale Journal on Regulation 
857 (2017). 
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Freeing up the cost of capital originally imposed by the CCyb does not automatically result in 
more lending or forbearance. During the Covid-19 crisis, borrowers’ creditworthiness would 
be difficult to discern. Banks may be behaviourally inclined to refrain from lending due to risk 
aversion and impediments to efficient markets such as acute information asymmetry, and may 
hoard capital instead. Hence the PRA and FCA supplemented the inherently flexible measure 
of the CCyb by suspending other regulations not inherently thought to be flexible, to send 
stronger incentive-based messages to banks. Such bundling of inherently flexible and 
unexpected legal elasticity gives rise to more fundamental issues and institutional dissonance. 
Our analysis is however not to discourage policymakers from deploying legal elasticity, but to 
encourage towards deeper engagement with its effects.  
 
As loan forbearance creates doubt as to banks’ asset quality, banks may choose to conserve 
capital, or worse, raise capital to shore up against credit risks. In this manner, payment holidays 
would be contrary to banks’ ability to lend or help their borrowers. To steer banks’ behaviour 
towards ‘relief and rescue’, the PRA clarifies50 that banks should not treat deferred payments 
as being in default. Even if deferred payments do not resume promptly, they should not 
mechanistically be treated as impaired assets. Banks should instead seek to understand 
individual financial situations. However, permitting ambiguity in whether deferred borrowers 
are in default poses hazards to regulatory objectives and banks’ resilience.  
 
After the global financial crisis, a forward-looking approach51 to loan loss provision for banks 
was encouraged. The accounting standard IFRS 9 requires banks to account for debt 
instruments at fair value52 and ensure that they have sufficient capital to absorb potential losses. 
Payment holidays exacerbate information asymmetry in relation to borrowers’ 
creditworthiness and banks may make increased loan loss provisions against these,53 paddling 
back against the capital liberation that has been offered. The PRA had to moderate banks’ 
tendencies by encouraging54 more discretionary assessment on borrowers’ credit risks instead 
of risk aversion across the board. However, banks used to prescriptive numerical prudential 
regulation would find this expectation difficult to implement in the face of dissonance in 
changing regulatory objectives. Banks suffer from uncertainty to what extent the boundaries of 
existing regulations can be pushed.55 The PRA has in effect ‘delegated’ to banks the 
 
50 PRA, Letter from Sam Woods, Covid-19: IFRS 9, capital requirements and loan covenants (26 March 2020), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/letter/2020/covid-19-ifrs-9-capital-requirements-and-
loan-covenants; PRA, Statement by the PRA on regulatory capital and IFRS 9 requirements for payment holidays 
(22 May 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2020/statement-on-
application-regulatory-capital-ifrs9. 
51 Rosa M. Lastra, Defining Forward Looking, Judgement-Based Supervision, 14 Journal of Banking Regulation 
222–223 (2013). 
52 Unless they satisfy the contractual cash flow test and business model assessment requirement. 
53 “European bank investors brace for loan-loss provisions.” Financial Times, April 27, 2020. 
https://www.ft.com/content/1d9d862a-df05-47c1-8245-cf798127165f; “BoE warns bank loan reserves risk 
choking business funding.” Financial Times, 26 April 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/75767049-edfb-4074-
942c-f9ce4d07f861; “UK banks’ loan loss provisions soar in face of pandemic.” S&P Global Market Intelligence, 
7 May 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/uk-banks-
loan-loss-provisions-soar-in-face-of-pandemic-58478176. 
54 PRA, Statement by the PRA on regulatory capital and IFRS 9 requirements for payment holidays (22 May 
2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2020/statement-on-application-
regulatory-capital-ifrs9. 
55 Section V. 
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implementation of such a balance at the micro level of evaluating their borrowers. European 
regulators also face this similar difficulty in regulatory objective balancing.56 
 
Unintended Adverse Consequences for Markets, Institutional Stability and Distributive 
Justice 
 
Although well-intentioned, temporary payment holidays are not the same as permanent debt 
relief. Borrowers benefiting from this may behaviourally postpone their troubles, storing up 
arrears that may become even more unmanageable in the future.57 The FCA’s Chairman58 is 
concerned that customers are incentivized into unsustainable debt levels and future financial 
fragility.59 There is a lack of clear guidance to lenders and borrowers on negotiating the exact 
terms of debt servicing after payment holidays cease. The conduct of debt enforcement down 
the road is also a matter for concern from the point of view of social justice,60 as lenders would 
be anxious to mitigate the impairments to their balance sheets. How will the return of efficiency 
and contractual discipline affect consumers and are they factoring these into account in their 
choices under stress during the pandemic? Would and should there be a difference between the 
treatment of retail and business borrowers, bearing in mind that business borrowers may be 
responsible for job creation? 
 
Next, regulatory suspension affects market mechanism chains that may in turn adversely affect 
consumers. This is experienced in the US mortgage markets where securitization is the norm 
for supporting mortgage underwriting. Underwriters of mortgages seek to bundle mortgages 
into securitized assets usually after 3 months of such mortgages being written. Payment 
holidays affects the information quality of such mortgages as no reliable stream of income can 
be reported for securitized assets sales. This can in turn freeze up mortgage markets, adversely 
affecting households that need mortgages or refinancing.61   
 
Regulators also need to consider the distributive effects of regulatory suspensions. There may 
be a temporary distributive effect from lenders to borrowers as forbearance is implemented. 
The optimality of this redistributive effect depends on bank fragility and whether there is an 
increased chance of use of public funds to recapitalize them.62 Post-crisis micro-prudential 
 
56 EBA, Guidelines on legislative and non-legislative moratoria on loan repayments applied in the light of the 
COVID-19 crisis (2 April 2020, updated June 2020), 
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Publications/Guidelines/2020/Guidelines%
20on%20legislative%20and%20non-
legislative%20moratoria%20on%20loan%20repayments%20applied%20in%20the%20light%20of%20the%20C
OVID-19%20crisis/882537/EBA-GL-2020-02%20Guidelines%20on%20payment%20moratoria.pdf; ECB, 
Opinion of 20 May 2020 on amendments to the Union prudential framework in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic (CON/2020/16) 2020/C 180/04. 
57 “Lenders sound warning on mortgage holidays.” Financial Times, March 25, 2020. 
https://www.ft.com/content/3a6b82b0-6e77-11ea-89df-41bea055720b. 
58 Charles Randell, ‘A financial system to support the recovery’ (16 June 2020), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/financial-system-support-recovery. 
59 Id. 
60 “UK loan freeze plan leaves customers still open to arrears letters.” Financial Times, April 5, 2020. 
https://www.ft.com/content/7a533dc5-8cd8-4ef3-9963-d1f43e76ff47. 
61 “Payment holidays are messing with America’s $2.2tn mortgage machine.” Financial Times, April 17, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/f6c218a1-358e-4564-9919-1a96da91fc94. 
62 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, Bank Resolution A Decade After the Global Financial Crisis: A 
Systematic Reappraisal, in Douglas W. Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny Busch, and Steven L. Schwarcz (eds), 
Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years after the Great Crash (Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press 
 10 
 
      
Forthcoming: Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
regulatory reforms have made banks more resilient63 but it remains uncertain how far banks 
can push their newly-built resilience.64 Such concerns would shape banks’ behaviour in their 
pursuit of unviable borrowers when relief ceases. Yet the private enforcement paradigm against 
borrowers would likely be socially scrutinized.  
 
Finally, regulatory suspensions bring about immediate effects of institutional dissonance as 
their application leaves gaps and creates differences between markets. Regulatory suspensions 
for consumer and business credit do not apply to peer-to-peer lending arrangements. ‘Peer’ 
lenders are not regulated entities and only the platform that facilitates peer-to-peer lending is 
regulated65 in respect of their conduct of business vis a vis customers on both sides of the 
market i.e. the lenders/investors in loans and borrowers. This is a hazard in ‘regulatory 
commons’ articulated by Buzbee66 who cautions against regulatory gaps that may be 
ideologically anomalous but caused by the drawing of regulatory boundaries.67 The treatment 
of borrowers is completely left to the self-regulation of peer-to-peer lending platforms, some 
of whom allow payment holidays and ‘pass the pain’ to their lenders/investors by freezing 
withdrawals or slashing returns.68 
 
B. INCREASING CREDIT AVAILABILITY TO BUSINESSES 
 
The PRA has instructed UK banks that all elements of liquidity and capital buffers “exist to be 
used as necessary to support the economy”.69 This relates to the ‘rescue’ element of the UK’s 
policy for businesses to access credit during the Covid-19 crisis. This policy pronouncement 
arguably creates dissonance in relation to regulatory objectives in micro-prudential regulation 
designed to combat excessive lending and risk-taking70 in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. To facilitate the rescue agenda, the PRA introduces a raft of unexpected regulatory 
suspensions, but expansion of credit is also fiscally supported. Fiscal support for corporate 
borrowing, trade credit and commercial paper is also introduced in the US,71 although it is left 
to state and federal prudential regulators to work out prudential regulatory adjustments. 
 
2019) 31; “Why banks should raise equity to get through this stress.” Financial Times, May 18, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/d57f3068-2953-4424-82e1-1ae3db1bc5bf.  
63 “CET1 capital ratios at Europe’s largest banks, Q4.” S&P Global Market Intelligence, March 17, 2020, 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/cet1-capital-ratios-at-
europe-s-largest-banks-q4-57567429. 
64 ‘Are Britain’s banks strong enough for coronavirus?’ (BBC News, 20 May 2020); Alissa Kleinnijenhuis, Laura 
Kodres, Thom Wetzer, Usable Bank Capital (30 June 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/usable-bank-
capital#.XwA9ibxoIRc.twitter; “Banks need to prepare now for Covid-19 losses later.” Financial Times, July 9, 
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/918fe325-8a7f-4646-9031-6e7f2d61b3db. 
65 FCA, Loan-based (‘peer-to-peer’) and investment-based crowdfunding platforms: Feedback to CP18/20 and 
final rules (June 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-14.pdf. 
66 William W Buzbee, A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa Law Review 1 (2003). 
67 Charles AE Goodhart and Rosa M Lastra, Border Problems, 13 Journal of International Economic Law 705 
(2010) on regulatory boundaries being challenged due to the structural changes that innovation brings to markets. 
68 ‘The quandary facing P2P lenders and borrower payment holidays’ (25 March 2020), 
https://www.p2pfinancenews.co.uk/2020/03/25/the-quandary-facing-p2p-lenders-and-borrower-payment-
holidays/. 
69 PRA, Q&A on the usability of liquidity and capital buffers (20 April 2020), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2020/buffer-usability-qanda. 
70 FSA, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March 2009) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf, at 39-42; Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to 
Blame? (London: Polity 2010). 
71 CARES Act, Sections 1102, 1105 for small businesses, sect. 3102 for sectors affected severely, with a total cap 
of $208bn for loan assistance. 
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UK businesses with turnover of less than £45 million can benefit from the Coronavirus 
Business Interruption Loan Scheme. Under this Scheme, accredited lenders may provide loans 
and overdraft facilities of up to £5 million, guaranteed at 80% by the government, to be repaid 
over up to six years.72 Smaller UK businesses can borrow from the Bounce Back Loan Scheme 
that provides loans of up to £50000, guaranteed at 100% by the government to be repaid over 
up to six years with no payments in the first twelve months.73 Lenders are expected to assess 
businesses’ credit-worthiness, and eligible borrowers should be healthy ones suffering only 
short to medium-term revenue loss caused by the lockdown.  
 
Regulatory suspensions to incentivize bank lending, besides the CCyb adjustment, include the 
use of all regulatory buffers, the liquidity ratio and a generous treatment of leverage ratio 
constraints. First, regulatory capital buffers such as the capital conservation, systemic risk, 
PRA buffer and buffers applying to systemically important banks are imposed on banks as risk-
constraining measures in post-crisis reforms.74 Banks may draw down any discretionary 
buffer75 they have on top of regulatory ones, and after its exhaustion draw down their regulatory 
buffers.76 The PRA and FPC have nevertheless maintained the notional levels of mandatory 
regulatory buffers (except CCyb), for institutional continuity in capital regulation.77  
 
Second, banks are encouraged to allow businesses with credit lines and undrawn credit to draw 
upon such lines, even if this means banks’ liquidity ratios may fall below the mandatory 100% 
they are supposed to maintain.78 The liquidity coverage ratio is intended to be maintained at all 
times at 100% so that banks can meet their cash outflows for a period of 30 days to prevent a 
liquidity-driven crisis.79 This unexpected elasticity however raises concerns about the 
balancing of short-term crisis management objectives against prudential objectives. However, 
it may be argued banks’ risk of depleting their liquidity is mitigated by the Bank of England’s 
new Coronavirus Corporate Financing Facility,80 designed to help businesses tide over 
liquidity squeezes through their bank.  
 
At the EU level, a new legislative initiative allows banks not to count certain loans as subject 
to the prudential measure of the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio limits all leverage created by 
 
72 Great Britain. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Coronavirus Business Interruption 
Loan Scheme (23 March 2020), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-the-coronavirus-business-interruption-
loan-scheme. 
73 Great Britain. Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Dept, Apply for a coronavirus Bounce Back Loan (27 
April 2020), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-a-coronavirus-bounce-back-loan. 
74 Chiu and Wilson (2019), ch.8. 
75 PRA (2020), n69. 
76 Bank of England, The Financial Policy Committee’s Framework for the Systemic Risk Buffer (May 2016), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2016/the-financial-policy-committees-framework-for-
the-systemic-risk-buffer.pdf?la=en&hash=B354CE2068CD5B965DA07E15F6F10EFC80668B5F, amended 
2018, 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/policy-
statement/2018/ps3218.pdf?la=en&hash=6A70962B5B3893C0F944A61FB3239B4DE71C26A6. 
77 PRA, PRA decision on Systemic Risk Buffer rates (9 April 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-
regulation/publication/2020/pra-decision-on-srb-rates. 
78 PRA (2020), n69. 
79 Basel Committee, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (2013), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf, enacted in EU and UK legislation. 
80 BOE, Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF): information for those seeking to participate in the scheme 
(17 March 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/the-covid-corporate-financing-facility. 
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banks to be supported by at least 3% of CET1 capital.81 This backstops bank lending and 
compliments other micro-prudential regulation. The new EU Regulation,82 called the ‘CRR 
Quick Fix’ package, introduced temporary flexibility in calculating banks’ lending to avoid 
unnecessary constraint by the leverage ratio.83 Certain exposures such as guaranteed loans by 
national governments can be excluded from the ratio.84 The PRA regards loans made under the 
Bounce Back Scheme as not counted in the leverage ratio.85  
 
In order to precisely steer banks’ behaviour towards increased support for the real economy 
instead of perverse incentives such as rewarding shareholders, the PRA and ECB have 
discouraged banks from paying dividends or engaging in share buy-backs, as well as paying 
any cash bonus to certain material categories of staff.86 This is a different type of ‘suspension’ 
as it is a form of intervention that disrupts market participants’ expectations, such as those of 
institutional shareholders. Regulators’ power over dividend restrictions is warranted under 
existing regulation87 to promote the resilience of banks and financial stability. This use of 
discretionary power, outside of the original rationale, may however raise long-term problems 
relating to banks’ cost of capital and ability to attract and retain talented staff. 
 
The relaxation of micro-prudential requirements to incentivize lending is complemented by the 
suspension of externally administered stress testing. The Bank of England (BoE) carries out 
annual cyclical and biennial exploratory stress tests so that supervisors can understand banks’ 
capital-resilience and potential for continuity in stressful scenarios.88 The BoE has postponed 
the 2020 stress test,89 to reduce pressure on banks and focus them on the relief and rescue 
agenda.90 Although the BoE has discretion to determine the timing of stress tests, the drawback 
of such suspension is that information opacity may be exacerbated at this current time of 
crisis.91 Uncertainty over the timeframe for the next stress test makes it hard for banks to plan 
 
81 Arts 429, 430, Capital Requirements Regulation 2013. CET1 capital relates to shareholders’ equity, regarded 
as best quality loss absorbing capital. 
82 Regulation (EU) 2020/873, OJ L 204/2020, p. 4. 
83 EBA, Guidelines on reporting and disclosure of exposures subject to measures applied in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis. Final Report (2 June 2020), https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/supervisory-
reporting/guidelines-covid-19-measures-reporting-and-disclosure. 
84 Recital 9, Regulation (EU) No 873/2020. 
85 BOE, Statement on credit risk mitigation eligibility and leverage ratio treatment of loans under the Bounce 
Back Loan scheme (4 May 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2020/pra-
statement-on-crm-and-leverage-ratio-loans-under-bbls. 
86 PRA, PRA statement on deposit takers’ approach to dividend payments, share buybacks and cash bonuses in 
response to Covid-19 (31 March 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-
regulation/publication/2020/pra-statement-on-deposit-takers-approach-to-dividend-payments-share-buybacks-
and-cash-bonuses; ‘ECB extends recommendation not to pay dividends until January 2021’ (28 July 2020), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200728_1~42a74a0b86.en.html. 
87 Art 141, Capital Requirements Directive 2013. 
88 Donald Kohn, Stress tests: a policymaker’s perspective (5 February 2020), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2020/donald-kohn-speech-at-2020-ecb-conference-on-
macroprudential-stress-testing. 
89 BOE, Bank of England announces supervisory and prudential policy measures to address the challenges of 
Covid-19 (20 March 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/boe-announces-supervisory-
and-prudential-policy-measures-to-address-the-challenges-of-covid-19. 
90 “BoE cancels stress tests to ease pressure on lenders.” Financial Times, March 20, 2020. 
https://www.ft.com/content/7433d55c-6a89-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3. 
91 Kathryn Judge, Stress Tests During Times of War, Columbia Law School Working Paper (2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633310; Dean Buckner and Kevin Dowd, Can UK Banks Pass the COVID-19 Stress 
Test? (2020), 10, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3614865. 
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in advance92 and delayed stress tests also mean delayed supervisory guidance on banks’ micro-
prudential positions.  
 
Unintended Adverse Consequences for Bank Resilience, Regulatory Objectives and Social 
Justice  
 
Regulators need to consider the longer-term adverse consequences of increased lending, such 
as the accumulation of nonperforming exposures on banks’ balance sheets.93 This consequence 
is neither beneficial for banks nor borrowers as banks’ regulatory compliance may be 
jeopardised and their future capacities to support the real economy diminished. Further, balance 
sheet pressures can also entail enforcement against borrowers, leading to more social frictions 
between finance and society.  
 
In the UK, and arguably in the US, banks’ credit risks are likely exacerbated by fiscal support 
for government-backed loans. Fiscal guarantees may fuel moral hazard as the urgent demand 
for loans makes underwriting a pressed process exacerbated by information asymmetry.94 
Banks may minimize diligence standards as they do not have the incentive to price 
conservatively,95 relying on the eventuality of fiscal bailout. Commentators already expect at 
least 40% of Bounce Back loans to default in due course.96  
 
The level of loans made in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis that can be expected to be non-
performing would likely rise,97 entailing adverse consequences for bank resilience98 even if 
 
92 Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 Minnesota Law Review 2236, 
2250 (2014). 
93 Henk Jan Reinders, Dirk Schoenmaker and Mathijs van Dijk, Is COVID-19 a threat to financial stability in 
Europe? (2020), 2-3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633932. 
94 “CBILS faulty: Sunak’s flagship UK lending scheme looks unfit for purpose.” Euromoney, April 24, 2020, 
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1lbgfwrx72nn3/cbils-faulty-sunaks-flagship-uk-lending-scheme-looks-
unfit-for-purpose. 
95 Patrizia Baudino, Public Guarantees for Bank Lending in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, BIS Financial 
Stability Institute Briefs, 2020, https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs5.pdf; Pierre Schammo, “Who Knows What 
Tomorrow Brings? Of Uncertainty in Times of a Pandemic.” Oxford Business Law Blog (April 28, 2020),  
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/04/who-knows-what-tomorrow-brings-uncertainty-
times-pandemic. 
96  “UK banks warn 40%-50% of ‘bounce back’ borrowers will default”. Financial Times, May 31, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8a551c37-2de8-446b-a8b8-d4a61d33ef73. 
97 Ivan Huljak, Reiner Martin, Diego Moccero and Cosimo Pancaro, Do Non-Performing Loans Matter for Bank 
Lending and the Business Cycle in Euro Area Countries? (May 2020) ECB Working Paper Series No 2411, 2-3, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2411~839bc74726.en.pdf; IMF and World Bank, COVID-19: 
The Regulatory and Supervisory Implications for the Banking Sector (21 May 2020),7,  
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Miscellaneous-Publication-Other/Issues/2020/05/20/COVID-19-The-
Regulatory-and-Supervisory-Implications-for-the-Banking-Sector-49452; ‘Three US banks set aside record 
$28bn for loan losses’ Financial Times (Jul 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f1bbaf65-7cb7-4855-ba7f-
d9bda5f4b053; ‘European banks braced for €800bn of loan losses if pandemic worsens’ Financial Times (Jul 21, 
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1c4faf6c-975c-4566-8e0e-c9cbd613db42. 
98 Anil Ari, Sophia Chen and Lev Ratnovski, COVID-19 and Non-Performing Loans: Lessons from Past Crises 
(27 May 2020), 6-7, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-
research/resbull/2020/html/ecb.rb200527~3fe177d27d.en.pdf; Elena Carletti, Stijn Claessens, Antonio Fatás and 
Xavier Vives, Introduction, in Elena Carletti, Stijn Claessens, Antonio Fatás and Xavier Vives (eds), The Bank 
Business Model in the Post-Covid-19 World (CEPR 2020) 19-20, https://cepr.org/content/bank-business-model-
post-covid19-world. 
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banks’ current capital positions are relatively strong. Regulators are already concerned99 but 
refrain from impeding the policy goals of ‘rescue and relief’. We urge contemporaneous 
engagement with these hazards instead of blithe assumptions that the regulatory framework 
would simply resume after the cessation of regulatory suspensions.100 How far can the expected 
challenges to bank resilience be met by the fiscal backstop for government-guaranteed 
loans?101 Further, would a fiscal backstop not create a vicious circle problem for banks, as 
banks are also funders for sovereigns?  
 
Increased credit is also a snare for borrowers. The Bounce Back Scheme relieves businesses of 
payments for the first twelve months, but it is uncertain if this would be sufficient for a business 
to recover. The government guarantee can introduce perverse incentives for banks to accelerate 
treating recovering Bounce Back borrowers as in default so as to call upon the guarantee, 
exacerbating the pressure placed on the fiscal backstop. Huertas102 argues that current loan 
support measures must be coupled with regulatory thinking about reasonable conduct in 
treating borrowers in due course. 
 
It may be argued that the hazards of banks in supporting expanded credit are overstated as 
companies have the option of raising equity, a more stable form of finance, to tide over the 
crisis. Equity-raising also benefits from regulatory suspension discussed in Section IV. 
However, investors are risk averse during the Covid-19 crisis and can be highly selective or 
make equity financing costly, favouring companies that are already financially strong, 
punishing those that have signals of weakness but are not unviable.103 Empirical research finds 
that companies are turning more to debt than equity issuances,104 and companies’ stock market 
prices are penalized by investors’ perceptions such as whether they are affected by trade with 
China or have healthy leverage and cash levels.105 
 
Legal elasticity in facilitating bank lending is an important policy in ‘relief and rescue’ aims. 
But such elasticity creates a number of unintended and adverse consequences that policymakers 
should consider on an ex ante basis rather than wait for problems to be manifest ex post.106 
Regulators should engage in a fully-theorized understanding of the structural nature of legal 
elasticity, as follows: 
(a) Regulators should consider how they can engage and assist banks in the dynamic 
landscape of assessing asset quality and banks’ resilience and the impact of these upon 
 
99 Basel Committee meets; discusses impact of Covid-19; reiterates guidance on buffers (17 June 2020), 
https://www.bis.org/press/p200617.htm, reiterating the importance of maintaining the existing regulatory regime. 
100 PRA, Pillar 2A: Reconciling capital requirements and macroprudential buffers (July 2020), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/policy-
statement/2020/ps1520.pdf?la=en&hash=8FEBCB779D8FE8FB6328AB57AF79AA47B4914614 on a 12-
month estimated suspension of the CCyb, while the ECB refers to suspension until end 2021, n86. 
101 ‘Coronavirus: UK faces ‘explosive’ debt levels’ BBCNews, (Jul 14, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53402176. 
102 Huertas (2020). 
103 ‘Investors demand companies justify Covid-19 equity raises’ (April 2020), 
https://www.globalcapital.com/article/b1l2knxz0czqhq/investors-demand-companies-justify-covid-19-equity-
raises. 
104 Michael Halling, Jin Yu and Josef Zechner, Bond and Equity Issuance Activity During Covid-19 (May 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596114. 
105 Stefano Ramelli and Alexander F Wagner, Feverish Stock Price Reactions to Covid-19 (June 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550274. 
106 Nicholas Dorn, Legal ‘Elasticity’ and ‘Sidestepping’ in European Crisis Management of Financial Markets, 
21 European Law Journal 802 (2015). 
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banks’ conduct of customers.107 The supervision of prudential and conduct of business 
aspects can benefit from integrated conversations between the FCA and PRA,108 but 
regulatory coordination may be more challenging in jurisdictions with disparate 
regulators, such as the US. 
(b) Regulators may need to consider safe harbours from capital or liquidity breaches by 
banks in due course as suspended regulatory requirements resume.  
(c) Regulators also have to engage with how to strike a balance between economic 
welfare/justice and bank resilience, such as considering writing-off for non-performing 
loans that neither penalize banks nor borrowers in circumstances caused by the onset of 
the Covid-19 crisis. For example, the US offers loan forgiveness for small businesses 
for wages incurred by workforce earning under $33,333 in a year.109 The UK’s furlough 
scheme arguably goes further as government support for 80% of wages is structured as 
grants not loans. There are policy option mixes involving public and private sector 
support,110 debt versus equity,111 for regrouping corporations as economic engines, to 
achieve the balance between rescue of the real economy, bank resilience112 and fiscal 
implications.  
 
IV. REGULATORY ELASTICITY IN CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION: 
CORPORATE FUND-RAISING  
 
As freezes in economic activity during the Covid-19 lockdown threaten corporate revenues, 
business operational continuity and even survival,113 regulators have addressed equity fund-
raising by companies on an emergency basis. Equity provides a stable pool of capital for 
companies,114 and can reinforce a company’s financial resilience. Such fund-raising could be 
pre-emptive as businesses try to safeguard against the depletion of their cash reserves during 
the lockdown. The building up of companies’ capital positions would strengthen their ability 
to retain employees and maintain investment. Debt on the other hand may be more accessible 
but can exacerbate financial fragility.115 However, companies seeking to raise funds could also 
be in a precarious state, especially if they have high levels of debt and expenses. 
 
 
107 ‘EU banks should heed lessons of 2008 crisis’, Financial Times (Jul 23, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/companies/financials. 
108 Sect V. 
109 Sect 1105, CARES Act 2020. 
110 ‘UK financiers’ flawed call for grants not loans’, Financial Times (July 23, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/06281720-80dc-479a-97e5-ca319be74830. 
111 Alex Brazier, ‘Protecting economic muscle: Finance and the Covid crisis’ (Speech, Bank of England, July 23, 
2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2020/protecting-economic-muscle-finance-
and-the-covid-crisis-speech-by-alex-
brazier.pdf?la=en&hash=EC45632F7750897CB0C356D076DAB8597A442B90. 
112 Mathias Drehmann, Marc Farag, Nikola Tarashev, and Kostas Tsatsaronis, Buffering Covid-19 Losses – The 
Role of Prudential Policy, 2020, https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull09.htm. 
113 Luca Enriques, Pandemic-Resistant Corporate Law: How to Help Companies Cope with Existential Threats 
and Extreme Uncertainty During the Covid-19 Crisis, (2020) European Company and Financial Law Review, 
forthcoming, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3641505. 
114 Discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu, Can UK Small Businesses Obtain Growth Capital in the Public Equity Markets? 
– An Overview of the Shortcomings in UK and European Securities Regulation and Considerations for Reform, 
28 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 933 (2004). 
115 “Corporate debt levels risk amplifying economic fragility, says IMF.” Financial Times, April 10, 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/9be23506-5b64-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a. 
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The FCA issued a Policy Statement116 to facilitate corporate fund-raising exceptionally, to last 
only for the duration of the pandemic. This Policy introduces regulatory suspensions and 
adjustments to three key aspects of fund-raising: the treatment of pre-emption rights, the 
general meeting procedures ordinarily needed for shareholder approval of significant 
transactions in the Listing Rules, and the mandatory disclosure document required for the fund-
raising.  
 
A. RELAXATION ON PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS 
 
Shareholders in the UK have a right of first refusal to the company’s new offer of shares in 
proportion to their existing holdings117 unless pre-emption is exempt.118 The right of pre-
emption seeks to mitigate managerial agency problems as managers may offer new shares 
cheaply and easily to third parties if left to their own incentives. Shareholders would be 
adversely impacted in terms of value dilution and the reduction in voting power.119 In the US, 
pre-emption rights are the exception and not the rule, particularly for publicly traded 
companies, as existing shareholders have a choice to purchase shares in the open market if they 
wish to maintain the level of their shareholdings. Market mechanisms in the US are seen as 
sufficient to provide shareholder protection needs. The UK, despite similarity with the US in 
terms of deep and liquid capital markets, has a different balance of flexibility-control in relation 
to safeguarding the rights of shareholders.120 There is however the possibility that articles of 
association can provide for a waiver of pre-emption rights in advance, for a period of up to five 
years, so that directors can be pre-authorized to an agreed degree of flexibility.121 The limit is 
usually set at 5% of the issued share capital for any given year and not more than 7.5% of the 
share capital over a 3-year period. This best practice is recommended by the Pre-emption Group 
(PEG) which comprises a range of institutional investors. 
 
The PEG made an extraordinary recommendation to investors that pre-emption rights could be 
waived for issuances up to 20% of issued share capital during the pandemic. The extended 
suspension of pre-emption rights is not exactly a regulatory suspension, as it is recommended 
market practice by the PEG. Its status is more like soft law, with the FCA’s endorsement not a 
form a legalization but a reinforcing signal of legitimacy and a nudge directed to investors.122 
 
Although pre-emption rights are an aspect of mandatory ‘shareholder protection’ in UK 
company law, their exact implementation is subject to tailoring between companies and their 
shareholders in relation to pre-authorizations, disapplications and constitutional provisions. 
This is often regarded as the ‘enabling’ aspect of company law ideologically supported for its 
efficiency effects regarding the allocation of governance rights between voluntarily bargaining 
 
116 FCA, Statement of Policy: listed companies and recapitalisation issuances during the coronavirus crisis (8 
April 2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/listed-companies-recapitalisation-issuances-coronavirus. 
117 S561, UK Companies Act 2006. 
118 S564-569, id. 
119 Eilis Ferran and Look Chan Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (Oxford: OUP 2014), ch.5. 
120 Consistent with EU Second Company Law Directive; Jennifer G Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat (2019) University of Illinois Law Review 
CHK.  
121 S570-571, UK Companies Act 2006. 
122 Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Rethinking nudge: an information-costs theory of default rules, Harvard 
John M. Olin Discussion Paper (April 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582129. 
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parties.123 In the US, the enabling effects of company law are realized in terms of the doctrine 
of pre-emption rights itself being up for voluntary adoption. One can argue that the UK’s pre-
emption rights regime is mandatory and not enabling law. However, there are different shades 
of enabling law, in terms of the extent of discretion given for private agreements between 
companies and their shareholders.124 As the UK allows negotiated exclusion or disapplication 
of pre-emption rights between shareholders and companies,125 pre-emption rights can be 
regarded as a default rule but embedding flexibility.126 However, in a crisis situation, it is 
uncertain if shareholders are able to agree on coherent actions, and negotiation costs can be 
high in the face of uncertainty and different private preferences. In this manner, the role of soft 
law such as best practices recommended by the PEG provides a benchmark for convergence 
and efficiency in private decision-making (see Moore,127 regarding the Corporate Governance 
Code, another soft law institution). The need for harmonized optimal terms in company law, 
despite shareholders’ theoretical freedoms to bargain with companies, has been theorized by 
Easterbrook and Fischel.128  
 
Although the PEG has shown flexibility in waiving pre-emption rights, it is arguable that 
suspensions do not go far enough. Commentators have raised the prospect of shortening offer 
periods as lessons from the emergency fund-raising exercise by banks in the 2007-09 global 
financial crisis point to disadvantages of a long offer period. Ferran129 opines that long offer 
periods allow short-sellers to depress the issuer’s share price, adversely impacting uptake of 
shares.  
 
The FCA has nevertheless introduced unexpected regulatory suspensions complementing the 
soft law measure above. On the whole, although legal elasticity is deployed beyond what is 
inherently flexible, it can be argued that these measures build in significant market deference 
and are not overly interventionist. The bundling of inherent flexibility with unexpected 
suspensions may have led to a strong marketization character for the other regulatory 
suspensions, thinning out its public interest aspects. Part C in particular discusses this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 
Columbia Law Review 1599 (1989); Henry N Butler and Larry E Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Duties: A 
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Washington Law Review 1 (1990); Jonathan R Macey, Corporate Law 
and Corporate Governance a Contractual Perspective, 18 J Corp L 185 (1993); Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis 
of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 Del J Corp L 229 (2006). 
124 Eric W Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 Wash & Lee L Rev 1565 (1993); Jens 
Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65 Hastings 
Law Journal 441 (2014). 
125 S567-573, Companies Act 2006. 
126 see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 Yale Law Journal 87 (1989); Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 University of Chicago Law Review 1391 (1992). 
127 Marc T Moore, Whispering Sweet Nothings”: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate 
Governance, 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 95 (2009). 
128 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). 
129 Eilis Ferran, Limits of Private Sector Solutions for Banks: Recent UK Rights Issues (2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290717. 
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B. DISPENSATION OF GENERAL MEETINGS 
 
Next, the FCA Policy130 allows companies to financially re-organize themselves in a less 
cumbersome manner, by engaging in certain substantial transactions specified in the Listing 
Rules,131 relating to significant disposals of assets. It may be imperative for companies to be 
able to finalize their deals quickly, and such efficacy can be affected by the need for companies 
to seek general meeting approval stipulated under Listing Rules. Companies can now apply for 
a dispensation for general meetings, which the FCA grants on a case by case basis. Issuers 
would have to provide evidence that shareholders would have voted in favour of such a 
resolution if a general meeting had taken place.  
 
The procedural law of general meetings ensures that all shareholders receive the same 
information at the same time and are able to participate collectively in decision-making 
processes. In reality, such procedural fairness has been somewhat undermined as institutional 
shareholders have begun to be more engaged with their investee companies informally, as part 
of ‘stewardship’ (since the Stewardship Code of 2010, amended 2020,132 and the advent of 
similar provisions in the European Shareholders’ Rights Directive 2017).133 Policymakers’ 
approve of and encourage institutional investors’ monitoring roles.134 Moreover with the rise 
of American style hedge fund shareholder activism,135 the level of voice observed in the 
institutional shareholder community has risen, both because institutions have worked with 
hedge funds in joint campaigns136 and because the corporate sector has attracted negative 
attention since the global financial crisis and home-grown scandals.137 
 
The discretionary dispensation of general meeting procedures for substantial transactions may 
not be regarded as prejudicial to shareholders. First, its ‘bundling’ with the relatively more 
enabling company law discussed above allows shareholders to see the regulatory suspension 
in more integrated and less unfavourable light. Second, companies are still compelled to engage 
with shareholders, much in the ‘stewardship’ ethos of informal engagement ‘outside of general 
 
130 FCA, Statement of Policy: listed companies and recapitalisation issuances during the coronavirus crisis (8 
April 2020), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/listed-companies-recapitalisation-issuances-coronavirus. 
131 FCA Handbook Listing Rules 10.5.1. 
132 The UK’s Stewardship Code, https://www.frc.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code. It is voluntary and 
administered by the Financial Reporting Council that oversees the quality of corporate reporting and professional 
roles of auditors; Iris H-Y Chiu, Institutional shareholders as Stewards: Towards a New Conception of Corporate 
Governance?, 6 Brooklyn Journal of Financial, Corporate and Commercial Law 387 (2012). 
133 Directive (EU) 2017/828, 17 May 2017. 
134 Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into “Stewards”- Exploring the Meaning and Objectives in 
“Stewardship”, 66 Current Legal Problems 443 (2013). 
135 John Armour and Brian Cheffins, The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 
Journal of Corporation Law 51 (2012). 
136 Dionysia Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism: Dimensions and Legal Determinants, 17 University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 789 (2015). 
137 Home-grown scandals include: fraudulent financial reporting, surrounding the collapse of Carillion plc, House 
of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, Carillion (16 May 
2018), 51-56, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf; the bankruptcy 
of Patisserie Valerie Plc; social irresponsibility scandals at Sports Direct, House of Commons Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committee, Employment Practices at Sports Direct (22 July 2016), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf?utm_source=219&utm_medium=
module&utm_campaign=modulereports; concerns regarding UK companies’ exploitation of global supply chains 
culminating in Modern Slavery Act 2015. 
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meetings’ to secure sufficient pre-approval. Finally, regulatory discretion in dispensation may 
be regarded as a gatekeeping device. 
 
Nevertheless, to allow dispensation of general meetings conditioned upon companies securing 
sufficient written consent of shareholders would mean that companies are likely to engage in 
selective engagement, with perhaps ‘friendly’ but significant shareholders to reach the needed 
majority. In this manner, the underlying principle of fairness amongst treatment of shareholders 
in the collective decision-making of general meetings is compromised. Further, retail investors 
are likely to be marginalized.138 Although stewardship practices already entail differences in 
the quality of company-investor relationships amongst different investors, allowing companies 
to selectively ‘court’ shareholders seems to go a step further and exacerbate the already uneven 
playing field. Further, even if companies accurately estimate the level of majority support this 
is not equivalent to a general meeting where the percentage of shareholders dissenting is 
recorded. The level of dissent is important for signalling the controversiality of company 
proposals. 
 
The FCA should consider the incentives on the part of affected constituents as a result of 
regulatory suspension, and the trade-offs made amongst different interest groups affected by 
the suspensions, especially if trade-offs exacerbate a longer-running issue, such as the relative 
marginalization of the retail investor, in the stewardship landscape that emphasizes the role of 
institutional ones. Should shareholder engagement be regarded as part of the enabling character 
of company law, that facilitates shareholders to tailor-make their monitoring arrangements with 
companies and or as part of mandatory law that standardizes common expectations of 
protection and reflects collective values?139 For the broader purposes of conceptualization in 
corporate law scholarship, bundling of regulatory suspensions in capital markets regulation 
with inherently flexible company law aspects raises more questions about the institutional 
relationship between the perceived ‘more enabling’ nature of corporate governance and the 
mandatory aspects. What boundaries are there, if any, between the ideological or jurisdictional 
separation140 of corporate law from securities regulation?141  
 
On the one hand, the bundling exercise may make porous the boundaries of enabling corporate 
law and mandatory securities regulation and allow regulators greater freedom to foray into the 
former.142 One the other hand, the bundling exercise may also result in the shareholder-centric 
ideology underpinning enabling aspects of corporate law being extended to the whole package 
of legal elasticity, therefore thinning out notions of public interest.143 The longer term impact 
 
138 “Bypass retail investors at your peril”. Financial Times, April 24, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/b9255dab-
385d-4182-8c44-200948bfaae2. 
139 Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 Harvard Business 
Law Review 132 (2018). 
140 James J Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA Law Review 116 
(2017). 
141 Robert B Ahdieh, From ‘Federalization’ to ‘Mixed Governance’ in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 53 Buffalo Law Review 721 (2005); Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities 
Regulation around the World, 2 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 81 (2007). 
142 Criticized in Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
Yale Law Journal (2005), but see Ahdieh (2005). 
143 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1461 (1989); Jeffrey N Gordon, 
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Columbia Law Review 1549 (1989); Robert B Thompson, The 
Law's Limit on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J Corp L 377 (1990); William W Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and 
Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 Berkeley Bus LJ 59 (2005). 
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on the nature of shareholder relations and corporate governance should not be ignored even if 
there appears to be pressure for quick policy adjustments.144  
 
C. RELAXATION OF WORKING CAPITAL DISCLOSURE 
 
The cost of preparing disclosure documents for investors,145 and how disclosure may affect 
investors’ behavioural biases in times of great uncertainty may be twin obstacles for corporate 
fund-raising. In such times, investors may greatly discount a company’s share price as they are 
susceptible to risk aversion. The FCA, with the PEG’s support, urged companies to utilize the 
exemption from the EU Prospectus Regulation 2017 with regard to issuances of securities up 
to 20% of total traded securities so these would not need to be accompanied by a prospectus. 
Ferran,146 drawing on lessons from the last emergency fund-raising by banks during the global 
financial crisis, recommended that suspension of mandatory disclosure in whole could be 
warranted if issuers are not new to the market and this would save issuers time and cost. 
However, mandatory disclosure is a cherished tenet in investor protection147 and suspending 
this may be counter-productive if companies’ cost of capital increases due to investor risk 
aversion.148 Hence, the FCA has not chosen to be more radical but rather to adjust mandatory 
disclosure in a manner that arguably puts issuers in the most favourable light possible. 
 
Companies’ annual reporting obligations still stand although filing can be delayed.149  Investors 
would likely rely on issuers’ disclosure on whether they have working capital for the next 12 
months as a going concern, such disclosure to be audited by the company’s auditors. The FCA 
has exceptionally decided to tweak this requirement by allowing companies to provide an 
unqualified ‘clean’ working capital declaration as if the company had not been affected by the 
crisis, and to append disclosure about effects of the crisis in a separate document not requiring 
formal audit, but only a comfort letter from an auditor in support. This only applies if a 
company’s adverse financial position has been caused by the pandemic and has not entailed 
from other weaknesses. The FCA requires the additional ‘Coronavirus Working Capital 
Statement’ to contain models and assumptions relating to the impact of the pandemic on the 
company. This tweak is arguably a form of framing that achieves a balance between investors’ 
information rights and issuers’ fund-raising interests. 
 
The Coronavirus Working Capital Statement is arguably a form of framing of information that 
mitigates investors’ behavioural biases in the face of negative disclosures. Kahnemann and 
Tversky’s prospect theory150 shows how the framing of information affects choice, and in 
 
144 Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial 
Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 University of Pennsylvania International Law Journal 1147 (2009). 
145 Elizabeth Howell, An Analysis of the Prospectus Regime: The EU Reforms and the ‘Brexit’ Factor, 15 
European Company and Financial Law Review 69 (2018). 
146 Ferran (2008), n129. 
147 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws, 61 Journal 
of Finance 1 (2006). 
148 Brian J Bushee and Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence From 
The OTC Bulletin Board, 39 Journal of Accounting and Economics 233 (2005); John L. Campbell, Hsinchun 
Chen, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Hsin-min Lu and Logan B. Steele, The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor 
Disclosures in Corporate Filings, 19 Review of Accounting Studies 396 (2014). 
149 FCA, Statement of Policy: Delaying annual company accounts during the coronavirus crisis (26 March 2020), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/delaying-annual-company-accounts-coronavirus. 
150 Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 
263 (1979). 
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particular, O’Clock and Devine151 show how negatively-framed information by companies 
affects auditors’ opinions (in the same way) and that the opposite produces a salutary effect 
upon auditor perception. The disaggregation of the ‘clean’ working capital declaration would 
help to avoid auditors’ biases against negatively-framed information.152 The confinement of 
coronavirus-related impact to its own separate statement frames such information as being 
more contingent, and highlights the exogenous nature of the impact. This may encourage such 
information to be assessed in more forgiving light and not to preponderantly ‘infect’ the 
positive framing within a ‘clean’ working capital declaration. 
 
A crucial question is whether such framing disrupts the balance of institutional values in 
securities regulation, i.e. the promotion of rational (as far as possible, despite behavioural 
biases153) investor market discipline for issuers. The rational investor brings about efficient 
pricing in capital markets,154 so ultimately, capital is allocated to the most efficient companies 
resulting in long-term wealth creation for all parties who participate and invest in the corporate 
economy. It may however be argued that such framing serves as a behavioural antidote to 
counter sub-optimal investors’ behavioural biases, such as excessive risk aversion.  
 
Nevertheless, a more important question is what the FCA seeks to achieve in the regulatory 
suspensions introduced. If the net effect to facilitate easier equity fund-raising by companies 
only entails rational, and arguably ruthless market evaluations of companies, selective and 
costly financing for these companies, the marketization effects of the regulatory suspensions 
could undermine a pro-social rhetoric in relation to saving companies or jobs. Should we allow 
the crisis to sift out the most robust companies, albeit bringing about a transitionary period of 
instability? Left to market forces, commentators155 find that investors gravitate towards funding 
companies with less financial fragility during the Covid-19 crisis.156 This may defeat the 
broader policy goals of saving companies and jobs, as capital markets can be excessively 
unforgiving towards companies with some weaknesses. There is a deeper question of whether 
market discipline should be the optimal channel for selecting corporate survivors as many jobs 
and near-term economic pain for households are at stake. 
 
The FCA’s intervention in framing reflects a hint of public interest in relation to preventing 
massive destabilization of the corporate economy and capital markets.157 As the UK Listing 
Authority, the FCA has an interest in preserving the robustness of London’s capital markets.158 
However, are pro-social goals relatively unarticulated and dominated by the private and 
marketized character of corporate law which the FCA has chosen to rely on? The regulator has 
refrained from more pronounced interventionist stances, such as stock market closures 
 
151 Priscilla O’Clock and Kevin Devine, An Investigation of Framing and Firm Size on the Auditor’s Going 
Concern Decision, 25 Accounting and Business Research 197 (1995). 
152 Brian, Callaway Daugherty, Carol, Dickins, Denise Dee, and Higgs, Julia, The Terminology of Going Concern 
Standards: How Subtle Differences in Wording Can Have a Big Impact, The CPA Journal 35 (2016). 
153 Robert J Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000). 
154 Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 Journal of Finance 383 
(1970). 
155 Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Kevin Rageth, and René M. Stultz, How Valuable is Financial Flexibility When Revenue 
Stops? Evidence from the Covid-19 Crisis, NBER Working Paper, 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27106. 
156 “Post-coronavirus growth should be more robust but less optimal”. Financial Times, April 27, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/e3c4b133-9aaf-4a32-bc59-03fa5438585a. 
157 Martin Wolf, “Coronavirus crisis lays bare the risks of financial leverage, again.” Financial Times, April 28, 
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/098dcd60-8880-11ea-a01c-a28a3e3fbd33. 
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proposed by Andhov159 in order to prevent short-termist value destruction by shareholders or 
short-sellers. Schammo160 queries if regulatory choices should be more explicitly 
‘precautionary’ in the public interest.  
 
Although we are sceptical that precautionary tools such as stock market closures are necessarily 
optimal in achieving a balance between pro-social goals in saving the real economy and 
investor protection in capital markets, the FCA should consider the substantive effects of 
regulatory suspensions, and whether more radical options are needed161 such as: 
(a) using public sector vehicles or public-private partnerships to support capital 
injection into companies alongside private sector fund-raising,162 in a manner that 
does not breach state aid rules;163 
(b) tying down investments made in support of companies during the Covid-19 crisis to 
duties, measures or restrictions in support of long-termism on the part of investors 
to help strengthen or rebuild companies, to avoid short-termist behaviour. A form of 
fiduciary duties imposed on hedge fund activists164 or controlling shareholders;165 
may be warranted;  
(c) requiring companies to make adequate disclosures and continuing transparency 
regarding the use of funds,166 especially where investors may have an interest to 
ensure that companies pursue sustainable behaviour going forward;167  
(d) instituting a form of prudential regulation168 for the non-financial corporate sector 
in order to improve their long-term resilience. 
 
 
159 Alexandra Andhov, “COVID-19 Market Protection: Close Down Stock Exchanges.” The FinReg Blog (March 
25, 2020), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/03/25/covid-19-market-protection-close-down-stock-
exchanges/. See opposite view Luca Enriques and Marco Pagano, ‘Emergency Measures for Equity Trading: The 
Case Against Short-Selling Bans and Stock Exchange Shutdowns’ in Christos Gortsos et al (eds). Pandemic Crisis 
and Financial Stability (European Banking Institute, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3607930. 
160 Schammo (2020). 
161 UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term 
Decision-making (2012),  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-
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content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2020.218.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2020:218:TOC.  
164 Iman Anabtawi and Lynn A Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stanford Law Review 1255 
(2008). 
165 Ernest Lim, A Case for Shareholders' Fiduciary Duties in Common Law Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2019). 
166 For example, investors expressed concerns that corporate bond issuances are unclear as to purposes of 
proceeds, and this can apply to equity issuances too, “Rise in Covid-19 bond issuance fans fears over ‘social 
washing’.” Financial Times, June 30, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/d35d1abc-0a4e-4e09-a776-
154a469ef8de. 
167 Sustainable investing is set to surge in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic’ (June 7, 2020), 
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We have explored critically the regulatory objective dilemmas,169 challenges, unintended 
consequences, and possible adverse effects entailing from regulatory suspensions in credit and 
capital markets regulations designed overall to achieve ‘relief and rescue’ of households and 
the corporate economy. Even if regulators do not intend to bring permanent adjustments about 
pro-actively or prematurely, they should engage with deeper and broader considerations in the 
deployment of legal elasticity, and impact on institutional dissonance. The deployment of legal 
elasticity can also be regarded as part and parcel of the need for regulators to engage in a broad 
notion of ‘responsiveness’,170 so that dynamism can be brought to substantive policy solutions 
as well as regulatory processes.  
 
V. DEPLOYING LEGAL ELASTICITY BY FINANCIAL REGULATORS - THE WAY 
FORWARD 
 
We propose three aspects of a management process for legal elasticity, as empowering 
measures for regulators rather than to prescribe what substantive solutions may be preferred 
for combatting the Covid-19 crisis. Different substantive solutions may work to different 
extents in different jurisdictions, but where legal elasticity is deployed, regulators face similar 
challenges. The three aspects of regulatory management deal with: 
(a) recognizing the potential for institutional dissonance and responsively managing these 
effects; 
(b) actively engaging in multipartite frameworks for crisis management; 
(c) pre-crisis preparedness on the part of regulators. 
 
A. MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL DISSONANCE  
 
The reluctance of financial regulators to manage institutional dissonance more explicitly may 
stem from fears of proactively bringing about institutional instability. However, the cosmetic 
approach of bundling regulatory suspensions that are inherently flexible with those apparently 
not does not of itself reinforce institutional stability. Fundamental questions regarding how 
institutional tenets and values ‘encoded’ in law or regulation have been rendered imbalanced 
arise, in relation to moral hazard,171 or financial institution resilience.172 Questions abound as 
to whether longer-term or permanent effects entail from institutional dissonance and pave the 
way for policy change in due course.173 As Baldwin et al argue,174 regulatory stability is not 
itself a tenet that should be necessarily maintained, but it is important to understand how it 
should be disturbed.175  
 
Pistor’s legal theory of finance provides the theoretical basis for conceiving of legal elasticity 
as structural in nature and inextricably connected with institutional disruption, even if that is a 
 
169 Armin J Kammel, Government Versus Markets – A Change in Financial Regulation, in Friedl Weiss and Armin 
J Kammel, The Changing Landscape of Global Financial Governance and the Role of Soft Law (Leiden: Brill 
2015), ch.1. 
170 Section II.  
171 Kammel (2015), ch.1 and 2. 
172 Viral V Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds), Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System. 
(New Jersey: New York University Stern School of Business, John Wiley & Sons 2009). 
173 Edward M Iacobucci, Reflections on Financial Crises, Regulation and Sunsetting, in Anita Anand (ed), 
Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets (Oxford: OUP 2016), ch.5. 
174 Robert Baldwin et al, Regulatory Stability and the Challenges of Re-Regulating (2013) 
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matter of degree. However, one may take a more limited reading of the theory. Pistor posits 
that there is a hierarchy of actors in the financial system, depending on their size and economic 
power from large systemic banks down to retail investors and borrowers. Legal elasticity is 
crucially supported by powerful structures, as was the case in the global financial crisis when 
these needed bail-outs. Elasticity tends to be more accentuated at the top of the system to the 
benefit of sovereigns and large banks, while those at the bottom are left to face the full rigour 
of the law. The Covid-19 pandemic is however exogenous to the financial system in the sense 
that financial firms are not responsible for its occurrence. Hence, powerful structures would 
unlikely support legal elasticity towards radical institutional change. Elasticity is posited as 
temporary for welfarist goals. 
 
However, the objective effects observed are that elasticity does bring to fore questions 
regarding regulatory objective trade-offs, and normative questions regarding what finance’s 
role is and should be. Is it right at the end of the Covid-19 crisis for banks simply to return to 
an ‘enforcement’ mode against borrowers? Is this issue only a matter of conduct of business?176 
Would consumer protection require more radical distributive treatment such as debt 
forgiveness? With prolonged economic uncertainty, these questions cannot be answered 
satisfactorily with simple resumption of regulatory regimes. Power structures alone may not 
sustain institutional stability, as bottom-up social demands can exert new pressures due to the 
longer-term effects of institutional dissonance. One of us has argued that social movements 
have contributed to a gradual institutional change in corporate regulation.177 Lothian178 and 
Arup179 have also, in the wake of the global financial crisis, called for greater socialization of 
financial regulation objectives. Such a radical re-orientation is not yet seen in the UK, being 
dominated by an economic paradigm180 in financial regulation. Post-crisis reforms have only 
edged closer to macro-level economic perspectives such as financial stability.181 However, 
there is a consistent social cry for financial regulation reform such as in consumer welfare.182 
The undercurrents of dissatisfaction with the myopic paradigms of financial regulation may 
again be raised in the opportunities provided by institutional dissonance.  
 
Financial regulators should deploy legal elasticity with an understanding of its structural nature 
in accordance with the fully theorized account of Pistor’s theory. It should be recognized that 
some extent of institutional dissonance will result, and regulators should give consideration to 
monitoring the levels of and managing such dissonance. Keeping an open mind allows 
regulators more fully to appreciate the risks and opportunities in deploying legal elasticity and 
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allows regulators to operate more fully in the intersection between financial regulation and 
wider public policy goals.  
 
Proposal One: Financial regulators should expect institutional dissonance and focus on how 
to monitor and manage it in terms of public discourse and policy review. Regulators should 
factor such effects into their decision-making matrix. 
 
We suggest that financial regulators can benefit from an approach of rational but holistic 
regulatory decision-making.183 Such a rational approach can be even more justified in the midst 
of crisis management where behavioural biases, such as risk aversion and short-termism may 
dominate perception. 
 
Regulatory decision-making can be grounded in cost-benefit analysis in its broadest terms.184 
This approach allows regulators to anticipate and assess the broadest possible effects of legal 
elasticity. This approach goes beyond looking to monetary values of benefits and drawbacks 
in the marketized sense, and seeks to encompass ‘hard to value’, controversial and subjective 
evaluations in a holistic way. The evaluative compass is anchored upon the human perspective, 
including the difficulties in putting a value on social values and preferences.185 The broad 
pursuit of such cost-benefit analysis is challenging, as it requires regulators to have a broad 
scope of information before them186 and to make dynamic and responsive judgments.  
 
Commentators have criticized regulatory implementation of cost-benefit approaches in regular 
times as being flawed as they have become narrowly defined,187 avoiding hard questions,188 
and highly proceduralized.189 However, as Wiener190 argues, cost-benefit analysis need not be 
practised in narrow, formalistic and meaningless terms.  
 
We encourage regulators to consider broadly and holistically near and longer-term effects and 
implications when deploying legal elasticity. Opportunities for law reform should not be ruled 
out. Where regulatory suspensions have mobilized a suite of laws and regulations not 
inherently thought to be flexible, regulators can consider if more flexibility needs to be built 
into regulatory systems.191 The evaluative approach also provides a more robust basis for 
regulatory accountability.192 
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This leads us to the second proposal, intricately linked to Proposal One. Financial regulators 
have communicated at great length to their regulated entities to carry out regulatory 
suspensions and to adhere to the institutional framework, especially in micro-prudential 
regulation and corporate transparency in capital markets regulation. Such communications give 
the impression that, because financial regulators firmly believe in their assumption of 
institutional stability, the management of institutional dissonance is merely an 
implementational matter for the regulated entities. In this manner, institutional dissonance can 
become externalized or ‘delegated’ to their regulated entities. This leads to hazards in terms of 
unexpected behaviour on the part of regulated entities and social justice consequences. We 
argue that regulatory leadership is necessary for managing such ‘delegated implementation’.  
 
B. DELEGATED IMPLEMENTATION BY REGULATED ENTITIES IN MANAGING 
INSTITUTIONAL DISSONANCE 
 
Balancing the policy of relief and rescue, and adherence with existing regulations193 is 
challenging. How should banks exercise the discretion to be able to draw down capital and 
liquidity buffers, not being certain where the bottom-line is, or to make less loan loss 
provisions, not being certain how much to provision for? The exercise of discretion by banks 
can become a burden, not a freedom.  
 
At a broader level, this is an archetypical problem of modern regulatory approaches such as 
meta-regulation194 where regulators’ broad principles and open-ended frameworks are by 
necessity realized through implementation by firms. Firms cannot be overly prescribed as 
regulators cannot micro-manage regulatory compliance. However, the breadth of discretion in 
implementation can lead to firms’ cosmetic compliance195 if firms are not committed to the 
underlying policy. Firms can also be left to a form of self-regulation if regulators fail to 
supervise meaningfully.196 In the deployment of legal elasticity in credit and capital markets 
regulation, regulators have tended towards a greater degree of leaving to regulated entities and 
markets to implement legal elasticity. The more regulators assume that institutional stability is 
not affected by temporary legal elasticity, the more likely a ‘delegated’ approach will ensue, in 
the meta-regulatory outworking of legal elasticity. Regulated entities, in managing the 
uncertainties of institutional dissonance, can engage in undesirable behavioural responses.  
 
One, regulated entities can become excessively risk averse, mindful of the possible boomerang 
effect of compliance once elasticity recedes. This can explain why the Coronavirus business 
interruption loan scheme discussed in Section III did not result in much lending. Second, 
delegated implementation by the regulated sector can give rise to perverse behaviour to exploit 
opportunities.197 It was reported in the UK that private-equity owned companies that were 
already debt-laden sought to increase debt by turning to government-backed loans. This caused 
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public outcry as private equity backers are seen as exploitative and unwilling to capitalize 
companies in a manner that may help them become more resilient in the future.198 These 
companies would also be competing with others for loan finance, and could unduly deprive 
other companies from accessing such finance. Third, delegated implementation can also entail 
behavioural sub-optimality on the part of regulators. Regulators place blame on the regulated 
sector199 if social sentiment is unfavourable to their actions.200  
 
Legal elasticity often results in reallocations of burden and benefit. The dangers of delegated 
implementation for distributive consequences are: (a) welfare outcomes may be attributed to 
regulated entities’ actions, putting them in a difficult position in balancing their private 
decision-making, the needs for regulatory compliance and the part they play in the public 
policy of ‘relief and rescue’; and (b) the roles of regulators and policymakers may become 
ambiguous even though welfare outcomes that result are essentially matters of public interest.  
 
Distributive judgments implicate private capacities201 as well as public institutional structures, 
in relation to the nature of the Lockean social contract in politics. The rise of the risk society202 
and welfare state in Western developed countries,203 poses the question whether consumers 
should be favoured in terms of protection, relief and welfare, and under what circumstances 
should the operation of market forces be regarded as optimal.204 Even in an institutional 
context, there can be redistributive consequences. The adjustments to mandatory disclosure for 
securities offerings in emergency fund-raising by corporations discussed in Section IV have 
redistributive consequences in terms of reducing cost for companies, but potentially increasing 
opacity cost for investors.  
 
Financial regulators should engage continuously with the regulated sector carrying out the 
delegated implementation of legal elasticity. Further, supervisory steering is needed in light of 
behavioural developments that may be unexpected. Policy steering would be needed for 
broader implications of welfare outcomes that are mixed matters of private and public interest. 
Legal elasticity has to be managed relationally, with those tasked to implement it, as well as 
those likely to be affected by or interested in the outcomes of implementing legal elasticity. 
 
Proposal Two: Consistent with a pro-active approach to monitoring and managing 
institutional dissonance entailing from legal elasticity, regulators should engage in 
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relational frameworks, proactively with their regulated entities, also extending to other 
agencies and stakeholders. 
 
The relational management aspects of legal elasticity include: 
(a) The relationships amongst financial regulators, relevant agencies and policymakers;205  
(b) The relationships between regulated entities and regulators;  
(c) The relational dimension between regulators, policymakers, stakeholders or society 
more broadly, as crisis management benefits from multi-stakeholder participation and 
drawing together of resources,206 social mobilisation and solidarity. 
 
One of the lessons from the global financial crisis for financial regulators was the need to 
coordinate amongst each other. In the UK, crisis management must be coordinated between 
the Treasury, BoE and PRA in respect of financial stability and public interest needs.207 As the 
reform was inspired by the last crisis relating to financial instability, the FCA was excluded 
due to a lack of perception of business conduct as being contributory to these objectives.208 
However, the global financial crisis was quickly followed by business conduct scandals in the 
banking industry.209 In practice, the PRA and FCA closely coordinate policies and actions, 
such as in the management of the Covid-19 crisis.  
 
Although the regulated-regulator relationship is fraught with lobbying, informal ‘capture or 
sympathy’210 or excessive trust (especially before the global financial crisis),211 it remains 
imperative that regulators maintain informational and supervisory proximity to the regulated. 
Omarova212 argued, in the wake of the global financial crisis, that a system of tripartite financial 
regulation should be introduced where ‘bankers’ and ‘bureaucrats’ would enrol ‘guardians’ 
who are stakeholders representing public interest to co-govern in financial regulation. Such a 
multipartite form of networked governance has always been envisaged in regulatory theory.213 
Perhaps there is fear that diverse demands from multiple stakeholders may confuse the policy 
agenda. However, excluding voice or dialogue at a time of crisis-management does not 
necessarily lead to more effective policy decisions. In Section IV, the FCA and the PEG 
legitimized the waiver of pre-emption rights for capital-raising by companies, showing the 
importance of catalysing influence on the part of non-public sector stakeholders. However, 
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there may be an issue regarding how stakeholders are selectively engaged by regulators for the 
purposes of crisis management. An example of a more open multistakeholder dialogue during 
the Covid-19 crisis is the UK Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee’s (BEIS) 
channel for feedback214 from the business sector in relation to impact and needs. Such a channel 
is open to the public although the Committee may engage in further dialogue with selective 
respondents.  
 
C. PREPARATION FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND LEGAL ELASTICITY 
 
Finally, if legal elasticity is to become a staple part of crisis management for financial 
regulators, regulators need to engage with it in an ex ante and sustained manner. Regulators 
should have a pre-crisis framework for thinking about the scope of and possibilities relating to 
legal elasticity.  
 
Proposal Three: Financial regulators should have a pre-crisis framework for crisis 
management, including deploying legal elasticity, as this goes some way towards the ex post 
management of institutional dissonance. 
 
Regulators should have a dedicated outfit for pre-crisis preparation, and wisdom may be 
borrowed from scenario planning literature in business management. Oliver and Parrett215 
argue that the more dynamic and unpredictable a business environment may be, the more a 
business needs to engage in scenario planning. Scenario planning allows business leaders to 
take stock of information and possibilities in a holistic manner, and consider the existing suite 
of tools in imagining responses.  
 
In a similar vein, pre-crisis preparation on the part of regulators can incorporate useful elements 
from scenario planning. Regulators already have access to significant amounts of market and 
regulated information,216 a development since the global financial crisis.217 Such information 
should also be regularly shared amongst networked regulators and policymakers discussed in 
Proposal Two.218 
 
Next, regulators should model deploying crisis management tools and legal elasticity. 
Maymin219 argues that regulators need to be aware that the timing and duration of their 
interventions can promote regularization of dysfunctional markets but can also distort markets. 
Regulators should enhance their preparedness in considering scenarios where legal elasticity 
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may be needed. Crawford220 argues that although regulators cannot prepare for the exact types 
and extents of crises that occur, training intuitive judgment by a ‘wargaming’ approach is 
beneficial. This is similar to stress-testing that regulators carry out for systemically important 
banks and financial institutions.221  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Covid-19 crisis has severely impacted economic activities globally, entailing wide-ranging 
policy responses. A crucial piece of the mosaic in the policy response comes from financial 
regulation, as financial regulators adjust regulatory rules in order to allow the financial sector 
to meet the policy goals of ‘rescue and relief’. By studying the UK’s policies and experience, 
we argue that regulatory suspensions introduced by financial regulators obscure hazards to 
regulators, regulated financial entities, households and corporations and may fall short of the 
welfarist goals desired. This is because such regulatory suspensions affect institutional stability 
to different extents. We situate the deployment of regulatory suspensions within the theoretical 
framework for legal elasticity developed in Pistor’s legal theory of finance, and argue that the 
very legal nature of elasticity is structural in nature. Regulators need to confront the structural 
nature of legal elasticity to avoid greater hazards to legal certainty, institutional stability and 
ultimately policy outcomes.  
 
We make a series of recommendations to improve financial regulators’ decision-making 
processes. First, we propose that regulators should anticipate that institutional dissonance 
follows from deploying regulatory suspensions and should proactively seek to evaluate all 
relevant aspects pertaining to institutional stability and change. Second, regulators should 
engage constructively in relational paradigms with relevant public sector agencies, regulated 
entities, and broader stakeholders in order to monitor and supervise the outworking of legal 
elasticity. Third, regulators should put in place ex ante frameworks for preparing for crisis 
management and the potential use of legal elasticity. 
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